A Survey on the Design, Detection, and Prevention of Pre-Silicon Hardware Trojans
By Jonathan Cruz and Jason Hamlet, Sandia National Laboratories
The complexity of the semiconductor design lifecycle and globalized manufacturing process creates concern over the threat of deliberate malicious alterations, or hardware Trojans, being inserted into microelectronic designs. This has resulted in a significant corpus of hardware Trojan research including Trojan design and benchmarking efforts and development of corresponding metrics and detection and prevention techniques, over the last two decades. In this survey, we first highlight efforts in Trojan design and benchmarking, followed by a cataloging of seminal and recent works in Trojan detection and prevention and their accompanied metrics. Given the volume of literature in this field, this survey considers only pre-silicon techniques. We make this distinction between pre- and post-silicon to properly scope and provide appropriate context into the capabilities of existing hardware Trojan literature. Each major section (design, prevention, and detection) is accompanied by insights, and common pitfalls, which we highlight can be addressed by future research.
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